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Abstract. The activities of formal modelling and reasoning are closely
related. But while the rigour of building formal models brings signiﬁcant
beneﬁts, formal reasoning remains a major barrier to the wider accep-
tance of formalism within design. Here we propose reasoned modelling
critics – a technique which aims to abstract away from the complexities
of low-level proof obligations, and provide high-level modelling guidance
to designers when proofs fail. Inspired by proof planning critics, the tech-
nique combines proof-failure analysis with modelling heuristics. Here, we
present the details of our proposal and outline future plans.
1 Introduction
The use of mathematical techniques for system-level modelling and analysis
brings signiﬁcant beneﬁts, as well as challenges. While the rigour of mathe-
matical argument can oﬀer early feedback on design decisions, a key challenge
centres on how feedback derived from the analysis of complex proof obligations
(POs) can be used to improve design decisions. Such feedback currently requires
user intervention, drawing upon skilled knowledge of the subtle interplay that
exists between modelling and reasoning. For example, consider a simple cruise
control system with the safety requirement that the brakes (brake) cannot be on
while the cruise control (cc) is enabled. This can be formalised as the following
invariant:
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ
When the driver applies the brakes, i.e. brake := on it must be shown that the
safety requirement (invariant) is preserved, creating a PO of the form:
brake = oﬀ,cc = on ` on = oﬀ
Note that this PO is false. An (unsafe) solution to this failure would be to restrict
the application of the brakes via a guard, i.e. only allow the brakes to be applied
when the cruise control is disabled (cc = oﬀ). Clearly, the desirable solution
requires the introduction of an auto disable mechanism, i.e. the cruise control2
is disabled if the brakes are applied (cc := oﬀ;brake := on). While the two
alternatives do not represent a signiﬁcant burden to a designer, in general many
solutions may arise from proof-failure analysis. In order to make good use of a
designer’s time, modelling heuristics are needed in order to rank the alternatives.
This need for both proof and modelling heuristics is central to our proposal.
We aim to identify common modelling and reasoning patterns, and use these to
abstract away from complex POs. This will enable us to automatically provide
designers with high-level decision support oriented towards modelling choices.
In turn this will increase the productivity of designers as well as the accessibility
of formal modelling tools. We plan to implement our proposal through what we
call reasoned modelling critics.
A key inspiration for our proposal is proof planning, a technique for automat-
ing the search for proofs through the use of high-level proof outlines, known
as proof plans [6]. Central to proof planning is its proof-failure analysis and
proof patching capabilities [10]. Our proposal aims to build directly upon these
features. Speciﬁcally by combining the proof-failure analysis capabilities with
modelling heuristics we aim to automatically generate modelling guidance. Our
longer term aim is to combine the proof plan representation with a complemen-
tary notion of modelling patterns, which we call reasoned modelling methods.
This, combined with reasoned modelling critics, are the building blocks of our
notion of reasoned modelling: the study of the interplay between reasoning and
modelling.
While our vision is generic, our starting point is Event-B, which we motivate
and introduce together with proof planning in §2. §3 outlines the reasoned mod-
elling critics mechanism and shows its application through examples. We discuss
related and future work in §4 and conclude in §5.
2 Background
Event-B and the Rodin toolset Event-B provides a formal framework for
modelling discrete complex systems [1], and is mechanized through the Rodin
toolset [2]. Event-B promotes an incremental style of formal modelling, where
each step of a development is underpinned by formal reasoning. As a result, there
is strong interplay between modelling and reasoning and this is partly supported
by the Rodin toolset. This interplay requires skilled user interaction, i.e. typi-
cally a user will analyse failed proofs, and translate the analysis by hand into
corrective actions at the level of modelling. This is exempliﬁed in e.g. [1,8]. Typ-
ical corrective actions include strengthening invariants and guards or modifying
actions. Our aim is to provide high-level decision support, by automating the
generation, ﬁltering and ranking of modelling suggestions. Event-B models and
POs are closely aligned [1], whilst Rodin [2] is an extensible framework. Event-B
and the Rodin toolset thus represent a unique opportunity for us to investigate
reasoned modelling.
We will use the term models for both Event-B contexts (the static part) and
machines (the dynamic part). We will only use the basic features of Event-B3
and use standard notation:
EVENT hnamei b = BEGIN hgeneral substitutioni END
EVENT hnamei b = WHEN hguardi THEN hgeneral substitutioni END
where the event is only executed when the guard holds. Moreover, we use the
term action for the generalised substitution, while INITIALISATION is a special
event without guards deﬁning the initial state.
Proof planning and proof critics mechanism Proof planning builds upon
the tactic-based tradition of theorem proving, where primitive proof steps are
packaged-up into programs known as tactics. Starting with a set of general pur-
pose tactics, plan formation techniques are used to construct a customised tactic
for a given conjecture. The search for a customised tactic is constrained by a set
of methods, collectively known as a proof plan. Using preconditions, each method
speciﬁes the applicability of a general purpose tactic. Having explicit precondi-
tions provides insights when proof planning fails. The proof critics mechanism
[10] enables “interesting” failures at the level of precondition evaluation to be
represented. For a given method a number of critics will typically exist. Each
critic represents an alternative generic proof patch, e.g. conjecture generalisa-
tion. The analysis of a speciﬁc failure, and subsequent proof planning, provides
guidance in the selection and instantiation of a generic proof patch. In Fig 1 we
present a method and critic. These are deliberately simple – their role is to illus-
trate the basic critics mechanism. Proof patching has been applied successfully
to the problems of inductive conjecture generalisation and lemma discovery [5],
as well as loop invariant discovery [11]. Proof critics have also been developed
for abductive reasoning, i.e. the speculation of hypotheses in order to explain
a consequence, and applied to the problem of patching faulty conjectures [12].
The proof critics mechanism provides the starting point for reasoned modelling
critics. Moreover, in terms of exploiting existing critics, we see the work on
abduction playing an important role in our reasoned modelling critics.
3 From proof critics to reasoned modelling critics
As described above, our reasoned modelling critics will extend the existing proof
critics mechanism. This extension will involve two key components:
1. Firstly, in order to combine proof and modelling, our new critics need access
to models as well as POs. In addition, critics will now have the option of
providing modelling guidance, as well as proof patches.
2. Secondly, both methods and critics are associated with preconditions. We
need to extend the meta-language of critics to allow us to represent precon-
ditions which specify modelling heuristics.
To support access to models and modelling guidance, an extended critic schema
will be required. Our proposed extension is described in Fig 2. In order to illus-
trate the new schema and the kind of meta-language extensions we propose for4
method (rewrite)
INPUT: ∆ ` G
PRECONDITIONS:
1. exp at(G, Pos, L)
2. rewrite rule(C ⇒ L :⇒ R)








1. ∃ failed po ∈ {hrewrite, ,POi ∈ POs|
failed proof(PO)}.
failed po = h ,Pre, i
2. h exp at( , , ),
rewrite rule(C ⇒ :⇒ ),
fail i ∈ Pre
PATCH:
insert casesplit(C,PO)
The meta-predicates used above are deﬁned in Fig 3. Note that ∆ denotes a list of hypotheses,
while G and NewG denote single goal formula. Note also the use of Prolog meta-variables, in
particular the use of “ ” for anonymous variables. The scope of meta-variables extends across
all slots of the method and critic schemas.
Methods: A method takes as input a PO. The applicability of a method is determined by
evaluating its associated preconditions. In the case of our example method, i.e. rewrite,
there are three preconditions, i.e. i) there exists an expression L at position Pos within
the goal G, ii) there exists a rewrite rule such that L matches the left-hand side of the
rule, and iii) any condition C attached to the rule is provable within the proof context.
If the preconditions of a method succeed, then the output POs (potentially empty) are
computed via the eﬀects slot. In the case of rewrite, the eﬀects slot applies the selected
rule, i.e. the expression at position Pos within the goal G is replaced by R (rule right-hand
side) giving rise to new goal NewG from which the output PO is constructed.
Critics: During proof planning, both the success and failure (fail) of a method’s preconditions
are recorded. In particular, when a method fails a set of partial instantiations of the
preconditions are associated with the PO. In the casesplit critic above, this set is denoted
by Pre. The critics mechanism uses Pre to search for patchable exceptions to the method.
If the pattern represented by a given critic’s preconditions matches with a recorded failure
pattern then the associated patch is applied. This is illustrated above where the casesplit
critic associates the failure (fail) of precondition 3 of the rewrite method with a casesplit
patch. In general, a critic may require multiple failures in order to trigger a patch. In this
way, critics can apply both local and global proof-failure analysis.










PATCH proof patch (optional)
GUIDE modelling guidance (optional)
The above schema represents our proposed reﬁnement to the proof critic schema:
– The INPUT slot has been extended to include models, as well as proof obliga-
tions. Note that the schema allows for a critic to access multiple models. As a
consequence, critics can be developed that consider the internal consistency of
individual models as well as reﬁnements and decompositions.
– The declarative PRECONDITIONS determine the applicability of the critic. Pre-
conditions have access to proof obligations as well as models.
– The OUTPUT slot has been extended to include modelling guidance (GUIDE), as
well as proof patches (PATCH). While proof patches are automatically applied, it
is envisaged that modelling guidance will be communicated to the designer so as
to inform their decision making.
As with the original proof critics mechanism, the output slot becomes instantiated as
a side-eﬀect of the instantiation of the input and precondition slots.
Fig.2. Reasoned modelling critic schema
reasoned modelling, we develop below some critics and show their application to
simple control system problems.
3.1 Guidance for invariant proof failures via local analysis
Typically, a proof failure arising from an inconsistency in a model may be over-
come in a number of ways. For example, consider an invariant which takes the
form of an implication, i.e. X ⇒ Y . If a corresponding invariant proof fails, then
the failure may be overcome by revising the model so that either,
1. X is false, or
2. Y is true.
At the level of modelling these eﬀects can be achieved by changing the guards
or actions associated with the invariant proof, or the invariant itself. Here we
focus on local changes to an event, i.e. changes to guards and actions, and delay
the discussion of global analysis and invariant changes until §3.3. In general,6
disjoint sub(S1,S2) b = dom(S1) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅
failed proof(P) b = “P is a PO which is provably false or
has failed to be proven”
provable(P) b = “P is a PO that is provable”
max(A) b =  x. (x ∈ A ∧ ∀y ∈ A. y ≤ x)
exp at(X,Y,Z) b = “Z is the subexpression at position Y within
expression X”
rewrite rule(X ⇒ Y :⇒ Z) b = “A conditional rewrite rule”
pri var(V,M) b = “Priority of variable V within model M”
priority(S,M) b = max({pri var(v,M) | v ∈ dom(S) })
replace at(W,X,Y,Z) b = “Z is obtained by replacing the subexpression
at position W within Y by X”
sub2act({V 7→ D}) b = V := D
sub2act({V1 7→ D1,···,Vn 7→ Dn}) b = sub2act({V1 7→ D1}) ||···|| sub2act({Vn 7→ Dn})
sub2grd({V 7→ D}) b = V = D
sub2grd({V1 7→ D1,···,Vn 7→ Dn}) b = sub2grd({V1 7→ D1}) ∧ ··· ∧ sub2grd({Vn 7→ Dn})
guards(E) b = “Conjunction of guards of event E”
sat(P) b = “The predicate P is satisﬁable”
generalisable(H) b = ∃r,e1,e2,g1,g2. he1,g1i ∈ H ∧ he2,g2i ∈ H
∧ e1 6= e2 ∧ r ⇒ g1 ∧ r ⇒ g2 ∧ sat(r)
generalise(H) b = “The weakest r such that sat(r) and for the
most he,gi ∈ H, r ⇒ p (for at least 2 events)”
add guard(G,E,M) b = “Adds guard G to event E of model M”
add action(A,E,M) b = “Adds action A to event E of model M”
add invariant(I,M) b = “Adds invariant I to model M”
insert casesplit(C,P) b = “Progress the proof of P by a casesplit on X”
Note that S denotes a substitution, while H denotes a set of event-guard pairs.
Fig.3. Meta-terms for reasoned modelling critics
proof-failure analysis will generate a large number of proof patches. But not all
proof patches will make sense in terms of modelling. To address this problem we
wish to exploit modelling knowledge in order to rank the proof patches that are
oﬀered as guidance. To achieve this we envisage designers providing meta-data
in addition to their models. The preconditions of our new critics can then exploit
modelling heuristics as well as proof-failure heuristics.
To illustrate this idea, we develop two critics below. Each critic targets a
diﬀerent pattern of invariant proof failure, as outlined above. In addition, the
critics exploit a notion of variable priority – which is based upon the observation
that not all variables within a model may carry equal importance. Crucially, such
“meta-data” must be supplied by the designer. For example, being able to brake
is clearly more important than driving with the cruise control enabled. This
notion of priority can be expressed as a heuristic, and used to rank or even ﬁlter
modelling suggestions. Informally, where proof-failure analysis suggests that the7





1. ∃failed po ∈ {h , , ,POi ∈ POs | failed proof(PO)}.
failed po = hM,E, /INV,(∆,X ⇒ Y ` σ(X ⇒ Y ))i
2. ∃τ ∈ sub. disjoint sub(τ,σ) ∧ provable(∆ ` (τ ∪ σ)X ⇒ false)
3. priority(τ,M) < priority(σ,M)
OUTPUTS:
GUIDE add action(sub2act(τ),E,M)
Note that sub denotes the set of all substitutions, and elements of PO SET are quadru-
ples, i.e. model identiﬁer, event identiﬁer, PO label/type, and PO. Note also that the
scope of the quantiﬁcation extends across the critic slots.
Fig.4. A reasoned modelling critic based on a priority heuristic to modify an action
value of a variable should be changed within the context of a given event, we
adopt the following heuristics:
H1: If the priority of the candidate variable is lower than the priorities of all
the variables updated by the event, then it is strongly suggestive that the
change should be achieved via a new action.
H2: If the priority of the candidate variable is higher than the priorities of all
the variables updated by the event, then it is strongly suggestive that the
change should be achieved via a new guard.
Where priorities are the same, no ranking of the alternatives will be provided.
We represent heuristics H1 and H2 as critics in Fig 4 and Fig 5 respectively.
The meta-logical terms that appear within the preconditions of these critics
are deﬁned in Fig 3. Note that meta-logical predicates, such as priority, require
input from designers, as mentioned above. Both critics are applicable where an
invariant proof has failed, and speciﬁcally where the invariant takes the form of
an implication. We focus on solutions that involve the addition of either guards
or actions, where guards are restricted to equalities. Later we discuss how these
basic critics could be generalised.
The critic representing H1 (Fig 4) has three preconditions. The ﬁrst precon-
dition holds if there exists a PO of the required form that has failed to be proved,
i.e. an invariant PO of the form X ⇒ Y , which is associated with the event E
where substitution σ represents the actions corresponding to E. The second pre-
condition holds if there exists a substitution (τ) which falsiﬁes the antecedent,
where τ and σ are disjoint. The third precondition expresses a modelling con-
straint, i.e. the variable(s) introduced by the new substitution have lower priority
than the variable(s) updated by the existing actions. If the preconditions hold,
then the guidance provided takes the form of a guard – constructed from τ.8





1. ∃failed po ∈ {h , , ,POi ∈ POs | failed proof(PO)}.
failed po = hM,E, /INV,(∆,X ⇒ Y ` σ(X ⇒ Y ))i
2. ∃τ ∈ sub. disjoint sub(τ,σ) ∧ provable(∆ ` (τ ∪ σ)Y )
3. priority(σ,M) < priority(τ,M)
OUTPUTS:
GUIDE add guard(sub2grd(τ),E,M)
Fig.5. A reasoned modelling critic based on a priority heuristic to modify a guard
The critic representing H2 (Fig 5) again has three preconditions, but illus-
trates a slightly diﬀerent failure analysis pattern. That is, instead of making the
antecedent false, the analysis tries to make the consequent true. Note that the
third precondition ensures that the variable(s) introduced by the new substitu-
tion are of a higher priority than the variable(s) updated by the existing actions.
Here the guidance provided takes the form of an action – constructed from τ.
3.2 The cruise control system in Event-B
To illustrate the application of critics introduced above, we will ﬁrst formalise
in Event-B the cruise-control system that was outlined in §1. Recall that the
status of the brakes is represented by a variable brake, while the status of the
cruise control is represented by the variable cc. Both variables are of type Val =
{on,oﬀ}, where on 6= oﬀ. The variable brake is on if the user currently presses
the brake (pressbrake), and oﬀ otherwise. While the variable cc is on if the
cruise control is enabled (enable cc), and oﬀ otherwise. The system invariant is
represented as follows:
inv1 : cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ
and initially both variables are oﬀ :
INITIALISATION b = BEGIN brake := oﬀ || cc := oﬀ END
We assume that the following priority relationship between the variables has
been speciﬁed by the designer:
pri var(cc,cruise-control) < pri var(brake,cruise-control)9
critic (priority guard speculation)
INPUT
PO SET pos
MODEL SET { cruise-control }
PRECONDITIONS:
1. hcruise-control,enable cc,inv1/INV,poi ∈ pos ∧
po =
“





(cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` brake = oﬀ
”
2. disjoint sub({brake 7→ oﬀ},{cc 7→ on}) ∧
provable
“
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` {brake 7→ oﬀ,cc 7→ on}(brake = oﬀ)
”
3. priority({cc 7→ on},cruise-control) < priority({brake 7→ oﬀ},cruise-control)
OUTPUTS:
GUIDE add guard(brake = oﬀ,enable cc,cruise-control)
Fig.6. An instantiation of the ‘priority guard speculation’ critic.
Failure and modelling suggestion 1 The model contains events that control
the brakes and cruise control. The consistency proofs of invariant inv1 over these
events fails in two cases. Firstly, the event to enable the cruise control is deﬁned
as follows:
EVENT enable cc b = BEGIN cc := on END
This gives rise to the following proof obligation:
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` {cc 7→ on}(cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ)
which can be reduced to the unprovable goal:
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` brake = oﬀ.
However, the preconditions of the ‘priority guard speculation’ critic given in Fig
5 hold, and an instantiation of this critic for this example is shown in Fig 6 (after
some simpliﬁcation and unfolding). This instantiation suggests the addition of a
new guard of the form brake = oﬀ. If the suggestion is accepted by the designer,
then the updated event takes the form:
EVENT enable cc b = WHEN brake = oﬀ THEN cc := on END
Failure and modelling suggestion 2 The second failure with respect to inv1
occurs when a driver presses the brakes, as deﬁned by the event:
EVENT pressbrake b = BEGIN brake := on END10
critic (priority action speculation)
INPUT
PO SET pos
MODEL SET { cruise-control }
PRECONDITIONS:
1. hcruise-control,pressbrake,inv1/INV,poi ∈ pos ∧
po =
“
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` {brake 7→ on}(cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ)
”
∧
failed po((cc = on,brake = oﬀ ` false)
2. disjoint sub({cc 7→ oﬀ},{brake 7→ on}) ∧
provable
“
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` {brake 7→ on,cc 7→ oﬀ}((cc = on) ⇒ false)
”
3. priority({cc 7→ oﬀ,cruise-control) < priority({brake 7→ on},cruise-control)
OUTPUTS:
GUIDE add action(cc := oﬀ,pressbrake,cruise-control)
Fig.7. An instantiation of the ‘priority action speculation’ critic.
This creates the following proof obligation:
cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ ` {brake 7→ on}(cc = on ⇒ brake = oﬀ)
which, when simpliﬁed, becomes false:
cc = on,brake = oﬀ ` false.
In this case the ‘priority action speculation’ critic given in Fig 4 triggers, and
Fig 7 shows the corresponding instantiation. As a result, the following updated
pressbrake event is suggested to the designer:
EVENT pressbrake b = BEGIN brake := on || cc := oﬀ END
Generalisations of the critics An alternative deﬁnition of the invariant is
inv2 : brake = on ⇒ cc = oﬀ
which is the contrapositive of inv1. To keep our presentation as simple as possible,
our critics will not trigger on POs arising from inv2. However, this limitation
could be overcome by generalising the failure analysis, i.e. allowing the critics to
consider the alternatives of falsifying an antecedent and validating a consequent.
This could be achieved by changing precondition 2 as follows:
provable
 




∆ ` (τ ∪ σ)Y

Another limitation is that currently we only consider the addition of guards
that take the form of equalities. The ‘priority guard speculation’ critic could11
be extended to capture a more general notion of a guard. However, this would
require a new notion of priority, which is currently not deﬁned for arbitrary terms
(only variables and substitutions). Finally, global consistency issues have been
ignored. When an action is modiﬁed, the validity of other invariants may change,
or a deadlock may arise. The critics should be updated with such consistency
checks. Depending on how global analysis is dealt with – as discussed below –
the ‘priority action speculation’ critic of Fig 4 may have to also include such a
consistency predicate.
3.3 From local to global modelling suggestions
As mentioned earlier, we envisage that our critics will support global analy-
sis, as well as the local analysis illustrated via the cruise control example. For
instance, when attempting to prove the internal coherence of a machine, local
analysis may suggest the need to add guards across multiple events. Taking a
more global perspective, these local suggestions may reveal a more general mod-
elling suggestion. For instance, if a formula can be found that is logically weaker
than all the suggested guards, then the formula could be suggested as a new
invariant.
A concrete example of this kind of global analysis is found in Abrial’s ‘Cars on
a Bridge’ example [1]1. In this example a single-laned bridge between an island
and the mainland is modelled. Since it is single-laned, cars can only travel in a
given direction at a given time – and this is controlled by two traﬃc-lights: ml tl
is the traﬃc light on the mainland; and il tl is the traﬃc light on the island. The
lights can have two colours – green and red – and it is assumed that green 6= red.
Our discussion will focus on two events: IL out, where cars enter the bridge from
the island; and ML out, where cars enter the bridge from the mainland. Without
giving all the details2, two diﬀerent invariant proofs fail for these events. The
corresponding POs have the following form:
...,il tl = green ` σ1(ml tl = green ⇒ ...) where ml tl / ∈ dom(σ1) (1)
...,ml tl = green ` σ2(il tl = green ⇒ ...) where il tl / ∈ dom(σ2) (2)
A local analysis of each of these failures suggests making the antecedent false,
by ﬁnding a substitution τ such that:
disjoint sub(τ,σ{1,2}) ∧ provable(∆ ` (τ ∪ σ{1,2})X ⇒ false)
In (1), τ will be instantiated to {ml tl 7→ red} while in (2), τ will be instantiated
to {il tl 7→ red}. However, there is a common solution to these failures. Firstly,
we assume that the substitutions are turned into guards (by sub2grd). Now, if
an event is constrained by the guards G1,···,Gn, then adding an additional
guard Gn+1 to patch a failure is equivalent to adding the weaker guard G1 ∧
··· ∧ Gn ⇒ Gn+1 (via modus ponens). Thus the suggested additional guards
1 The example is modiﬁed slightly with respect to types.
2 These details can be found in [1] and http://www.event-b.org.12
can be “weakened” in this way with the existing guards of the events. For this
particular example, we ignore all guards except those shown in (1,2) – the other
guards are irrelevant for this failure. For example, from (1) the guard ml tl = red
is derived and “weakened” to give il tl = green ⇒ ml tl = red. We then try to
ﬁnd a common solution for (1,2), i.e. an r such that:
r ⇒ il tl = green ⇒ ml tl = red
r ⇒ ml tl = green ⇒ il tl = red.
Moreover, we require that r is satisﬁable, i.e. the trivial solution r = false is not
considered. The only valid such generalisation r (modulo equivalences) is:
il tl = red ∨ ml tl = red
which is suggested as an invariant. This represents a key safety requirement –
at all times at least one traﬃc-light is red.





1. ∃h ⊆ hs. h = {hE,Gi | ∃po ∈ pos. h ,E, /INV,poi ∈ POs ∧ failed proof(po)
∧ po = (∆,X ⇒ Y ` σ(X ⇒ Y ))
∧ ∃τ ∈ sub. disjoint sub(τ,σ) ∧ provable(∆ ` (τ ∪ σ)X ⇒ false)
∧ G = guards(E) ⇒ sub2grd(τ) }
2. generalisable(h) ∧ ∃i ∈ forms. i = generalise(h)
OUTPUTS:
GUIDE add invariant(i,M)
Note that hs denotes the set of all event-guard pairs, while pos and forms denote the
sets of all proof obligations (sequents) and formulae respectively.
Precondition 1 holds if a local analysis suggests that proof failures can be overcome
by the introduction of additional guards.
Precondition 2 holds if the suggested guards can be generalised to give an invariant.
Fig.8. A global reasoned modelling critic suggesting an invariant from multiple failures
With regards to realizing such global reasoning, we are considering two dis-
tinct alternatives via our proposed critic schema:
1. Combine both local and global analysis of the available POs within a single
critic, as illustrated in Fig 8.13
2. Firstly use critics to perform local analysis of the available POs, recording
any modelling suggestions. Secondly, use separate critics to perform a global
analysis, exploiting the results of the local analysis.
From a scientiﬁc point of view, the approaches are not very diﬀerent – and should
be seen more as an implementation issue. Experimentation will be required in
order to determine the most practical approach.
4 Related and future work
Our notion of reasoned modelling represents a new paradigm for exploring the in-
terplay between reasoning and modelling. As evident from the above discussion,
our general ideas on reasoned modelling are strongly inﬂuenced by the proof
planning paradigm [6], while the particular work discussed here follows from
the notion of proof critics [10]. Currently, Event-B users have to manually anal-
yse failed proof attempts and patch their models, e.g. [1,8]. This form of user
interaction represents a signiﬁcant barrier to the accessibility of the Event-B
toolset.
Previously, the application of design patterns [9] has been suggested for
Event-B [3]. The ability to reuse design patterns, and their associated proofs,
has obvious beneﬁts over the conventional notion of design patterns. Our work
with failure-analysis is more closely aligned with anti-patterns [4], i.e. common
patterns of bad design, coupled with solutions. Bad design, however, does not
necessarily mean incorrect design – i.e. the POs may still be provable. For this
reason the failure-driven nature of the critics presented here diﬀer from the con-
ventional notion of an anti-pattern. Another related area is ontology repair plans
[7] – proof failure is explored using proof planning techniques to repair ontologies
– i.e. proof planning is used to describe evolving models.
In terms of future work, our short-term aim is to prototype and further de-
velop the proposal presented here – in particular, investigate modelling heuristics
in addition to variable priorities. This will involve developing a plug-in for the
Rodin toolset. The core of this plug-in will most likely be implemented in Prolog
or Ocaml, both of which are well suited to the development of automated rea-
soning techniques. In terms of proof, we will initially rely on the existing Rodin
theorem provers. However, in the longer term we aim to incorporate a proof
planner. This will enable us to also develop critics that analyse successful proofs
and provide guidance along the lines of conventional anti-patterns.
5 Conclusion
We have motivated the need to abstract away from the complexities of proof
obligations and proof-failure analysis. To address this need, we have proposed a
technique of proof management that attempts to turn proof-failure analysis into
modelling guidance via reasoned modelling critics. In doing so we aim to increase
the productivity of designers as well as the accessibility of formal modelling.14
Our technique builds upon proof planning and, in particular, proof critics. The
proposal diﬀers from previous work in that it provides a uniform framework in
which proof-failure heuristics can be combined with modelling heuristics. It is
this combined approach that will enable us to abstract away from the complexity
of proof obligations. While our initial critics have focused on variable priorities,
our framework will be extensible, allowing designers to record meta-data relating
to other kinds of modelling decisions. A prototype in the form of a Rodin plug-
in is currently under development, this will enable us to empirically test and
further develop our technique.
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